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Local or State? 
Evidence on Bank Market 
Size Using Branch Prices 
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
eographic markets are currently defined by market
 analysts at each of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks, with 
oversight by the Federal Reserve Board and even the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In 1963, in U.S. v. Bank of Philadelphia, the 
Court ruled that the market for bank deposits is local. That 
1963 ruling still unifies market analysis at each of the twelve 
Reserve Banks. The flavor of analysis differs somewhat across 
Banks, but the stock is the same. Analysts stake off their District 
into local markets: either metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
or small groups of rural counties. Once they have designated 
the markets, analysts keep tabs on the distribution of deposits 
at banks operating in the markets.1
Designating the market correctly matters a lot when it 
comes to bank mergers. Suppose one bank wants to buy 
another bank that operates in the same designated market. 
If the banks’ combined share of deposits in that market is too 
large, regulators may frown upon the merger because it might 
stifle competition. Some bankers push back by challenging the 
Fed’s designated markets; “we are not too large,” bankers 
sometimes contend, “your designated market is too small.” 
To be fair, a lot has changed since the Supreme Court 
decreed that bank deposit markets are local. Competition 
across markets was limited then by state laws against 
branching. With those laws gone, banks can now just build 
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• Each Federal Reserve Bank defines the 
banking markets in its District at the local 
rather than the state level. The effect of bank 
mergers on market competition depends 
crucially on this definition of size, as 
competition could be stifled if the combined 
deposit share of two merging banks in one 
market is too large. 
￿ The elimination of state laws against 
branching now enables banks to compete 
across states—implying that banking markets 
are getting bigger and spurring a “local or 
state?” debate over market size.   
￿ An analysis of bank market size suggests that 
branch prices—the amount a bank pays to 
buy another bank’s branches—may be a 
better indicator of size than the current 
measure, bank deposit rates. 
￿ The results indicate that banking markets are 
not necessarily local. Prices for bank branch 
sales in ten northeastern states over the 
1990s are more closely correlated with bank 
concentration at the larger, state level
than at the local level.
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or buy1a branch in another city if doing so seems profitable.2 
Technology has also improved. Circa 1963, savers deposited 
and withdrew funds in person, so local nearby banks had a 
distinct advantage over more remote competitors. Now savers 
can bank at far-flung ATMs or via phone or Internet, so 
location matters less. In a study of European banking markets, 
Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) find that market contestability—
the threat of competition from potential entrants—increases 
with the number of Internet hosts per capita. Better 
information technology has also lowered the costs of managing 
widespread branch networks (Berger and DeYoung 2002).
In view of these changes, Radecki (1998) challenges the 
local-market paradigm. He observes that banks with branches 
in multiple markets tend to pay the same deposit rates all over 
the state. Moreover, deposit rates depend more on bank 
concentration (a proxy for competition3) at the state level than 
at the local level. Hannan and Prager (2001) challenge some of 
Radecki’s results—they find more differences in deposit rates 
across markets—but even they still concede that the growing 
role of multimarket banks tends to blur market boundaries.
Part of the disagreement over market size stems from data 
limitations. As Biehl (2002) points out, comparisons of deposit 
rates across banks in different locations can be misleading; if 
deposits differ across two cities, does it mean that the cities 
represent different markets, or that banks in those cities offer 
different levels of service? Comparing profits would be 
preferable (because profits capture differences in prices and 
services), but profits at the branch level are not available to 
researchers.
The branch prices we study are less limited. Increasingly, 
banks are entering new markets by buying one or more 
branches from other banks (Benz 1998). The price of a given 
branch should depend on the branch’s expected profits, and 
expected profits, in turn, depend on competition. All else 
equal, branches in less competitive (that is, more concentrated) 
markets will fetch higher prices because the absence of 
competition enables branch owners to lower deposit rates 
or service levels (or both). 
Using prices on 110 branch deals over 1992-99 in ten 
northeastern states, we run a type of “horse race” to determine 
whether branch prices depend more on concentration at the 
local level (as the local-market paradigm implies) or at the 
larger, state level. Our branch price data seem to work well 
in the sense that branch prices are always correlated with 
concentration at one level or another. Some of the specific 
1The District flavor enters in how analysts decide to group or divide rural 
counties into a designated market (DiSalvo 1999).
2Branching is less expensive than chartering a whole new bank with its own 
capital, board, and management (as was required before).
3We discuss the use of bank concentration as a proxy for competition later.
findings are consistent with the state-market hypothesis; across 
all years in our sample, branch prices are more closely 
correlated with bank concentration at the state level than at the 
designated market level. State-level concentration also tends to 
matter more for branch prices in dollars and cents, not just in 
statistical terms. However, the correlation between branch 
prices and state concentration depends partly on how we cut 
the data, so we cannot conclude entirely in favor of the state-
market hypothesis. Branch price data certainly advance the 
local-versus-state debate, and with enough such data, that 
question might be settled once and for all. 
The next section discusses conceptual definitions of markets 
and summarizes actual Federal Reserve practices in designating 
markets. Section 3 reviews some of the evidence on market size, 
most of which, it should be admitted, favors the local-market 
hypothesis. In Section 4, we present our findings, showing that 
branch prices also depend on concentration at the state level, not 
just at the local level. Section 5 discusses robustness and caveats.
2. Banking Market Definitions: 
Concepts and Practices
By “market,” we mean the market for bank deposits in 
particular. Banks sell loans and many other services, of course, 
but in its 1963 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the 
argument that antitrust analysts can use deposits as a proxy for 
the full “cluster” of banking services. Without that assumption, 
market analysis would forever beg “market for what?” 
questions.
So how big is the deposit market? The U.S. Department of 
Justice, the main antitrust agency, suggests that the market for 
deposits (or any product for that matter) can be viewed as: 
a region such that a hypothetical monopolist . . . would 
profitably impose at least a “small but significant and 
nontransitory” increase in price.4
The key word in that definition is profitably. The monopolist 
just represents a hypothetical case where the conjectured 
market is so small—a city block, for example, or a village—that 
a single provider could serve it. Suppose the hypothetical 
monopolist tried to raise prices (or lower deposit rates) in the 
conjectured market. If savers flock to another nearby bank or 
branch, or if another bank steps in and offers higher deposit 
rates, the monopoly bank’s attempt to raise prices will be 
unprofitable, and hence, transitory. Thus, the conjectured 
market is too small. 
4See <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/12.html>.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2006 17
The Justice Department guidelines above are more of a 
thought experiment, or a conceptual view. In practice, analysts 
at the twelve Federal Reserve Banks designate markets using 
simpler analysis. Following the Supreme Court’s decree, most 
analysts define markets as MSAs or groups of rural counties, 
then fine-tune the definitions using commutation patterns 
between locales reported in the U.S. census (DiSalvo 1999). 
Sufficiently high commuting between two rural counties, for 
example, might justify treating the counties as part of the 
same market.
The local-market paradigm implies about 2,000 banking 
markets in the United States (Table 1). The number and size 
of markets vary considerably across Federal Reserve Districts, 
ranging from about 3,500 square miles in the densely 
populated New York District to just 1,400 square miles in the 
sparsely populated Kansas City District. A sparsely populated 
region does not necessarily imply small markets, however. 
For example, analysts in Minneapolis judge that markets in 
their District are larger than those in the New York District, 
even though their population is sparser than the population in 
the Kansas City District. Note the vast range of deposits per 
market, too: $31.2 billion per market in New York, versus just 
$379 million per market in Kansas City.
3. Evidence on Bank Market Size
Researchers have considered a variety of evidence on bank 
market size, ranging from “how far is your bank?” types of 
survey questions to more technical studies of how bank 
deposit and loan rates relate to market concentration.
3.1 Survey Findings
According to the Survey of Consumer Finance, a periodic 
survey conducted by the Federal Reserve, the median distance 
between households and their primary depository institution 
in 1999 was just three miles, the same as it was in 1989 (Amel 
and Starr-McCluer 2001). Savers also stay with the same nearby 
bank for a long time; Kiser (2002) finds that the median tenure 
of a household’s main bank is ten years. When savers do switch 
banks, the most common reason cited is relocation, suggesting 
the importance of having a local provider.
Small business borrowers like their banks nearby as well 
(and vice versa, presumably), but the distance between them 
has grown. According to the Federal Reserve’s National Survey 
of Small Business Finance, the distance between the typical 
small firm and its bank lender in 1970 was just sixteen miles, 
compared with sixty-eight miles in the 1990s (Petersen and 
Rajan 2000). The four-fold increase suggests some expansion 
of banking markets, but at sixty-eight miles, the latest figure 
implies that markets remain relatively local.
This survey evidence shows convincingly that savers and 
borrowers like to be close to their banks, but it does not tell us 
how far banks will travel when they see profit opportunities in 
another market. Back when states limited branching, a bank 
could not simply branch into another city if savers there 
seemed underserved. Now banks can branch freely, so the 
relevant market, from the suppliers’ (banks’) perspective, 
could be growing even if demanders (savers) remain close 
to their banks.
3.2 Uniform Pricing
Stigler (1966, p. 86) defines a market as “the area within which 
the price of a commodity tends toward uniformity.” If prices 
differ across two regions, those regions must represent 
different markets.
Radecki (1998) observes that large multimarket banks 
operating in the six most populous states (New York, 
Michigan, Texas, California, Pennsylvania, and Florida) tend 
to pay similar deposit rates all over the state, and that deposit 
Table 1
Summary of Banking Market Definitions 
























Boston 86 193.2 145,488 753.2 2,217.6
New York  15 464.2 1,638,095 3,529.0 31,265.5
Philadelphia 33 327.9 359,018 1,095.0 4,611.5
Cleveland 120 224.2 137,029 611.3 2,072.8
Richmond 194 162.8 129,458 795.3 1,719.9
Atlanta 288 131.1 124,629 950.6 967.7
Chicago 256 164.4 123,928 753.7 1,423.6
St. Louis  266 74.5 45,575 611.4 544.7
Minneapolis 102 18.6 76,365 4,108.9 1,002.1
Kansas City  359 28.9 40,549 1,404.7 379.9
Dallas 267 57.6 77,051 1,336.6 667.0
San Francisco 132 39.9 NA NA NA
Source: DiSalvo (1999).18 Local or State?
rates are increasingly correlated with state-level concentration. 
Banks see the market as the whole state, he concludes. Hannan 
and Prager (2001) reaffirm the correlation between deposit 
rates and local concentration using more recent data, but they 
confirm that the concentration-price relationship weakens as 
the share of multimarket banks grows. Heitfield and Prager 
(2002) revisit the uniform-pricing finding using a larger data 
set. Rates on checking still differ significantly across markets 
(MSAs) within a state, they find, suggesting that the market for 
checking accounts remains local.5 NOW account and money 
market deposit account rates are correlated with both local- 
and state-level banking concentration, but state-level 
concentration matters more in more recent years.
As Biehl (2002) observes, differences in deposit rates might 
reflect different products, rather than different markets. 
Perhaps deposit rates in A are lower, but services (such as 
minimums) are higher. Profits are preferable to deposit rates, 
as profits capture any additional revenues earned by banks in 
less competitive markets as well as any additional savings to 
banks achieved by cutting back on deposit services. The branch 
prices we study later are closer to profits, so they may be more 
informative.
3.3 The Price-Concentration Relationship
For a given market definition, analysts measure deposit market 
concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
If deposits at bank i = Si percent of market deposits, market 
HHI = Σi Si
2. The HHI ranges from 0 (infinitely many banks 
with an infinitesimal deposit share) to 10,000 (one bank with 
100 percent of deposits). According to Department of Justice 
guidelines, a market with an HHI below 1,000 is unconcen-
trated, a market with an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 is 
moderately concentrated, and one with an HHI above 1,800 
is highly concentrated.6
The Justice Department guidelines presume that higher 
concentration indicates less competition. Researchers call this 
the structure-conduct paradigm: if market structure is highly 
concentrated, firm conduct will be uncompetitive. Some 
economists argue that the structure-conduct paradigm is 
5Differences in deposit rates across two cities certainly imply different 
markets, but uniform rates do not necessarily imply a single market 
(Heitfield and Prager 2002).
6See <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/15.html>. 
According to Department of Justice bank merger guidelines, bank mergers in 
predefined markets will not raise competitive concerns as long as 1) the post-
merger HHI does not exceed 1,800 and 2) the merger increases the HHI by 
more than 200. If the 1,800/200 screen is violated, applicants may be required 
to provide additional information to assure that competition will not suffer.
exactly backward—conduct dictates structure, not vice versa. 
Better performing banks (those that offer less expensive or 
better services) will wind up with a larger market share. Thus, 
concentration may reflect greater efficiency, rather than lack 
of competition.
These differing views predict nearly opposite relationships 
between bank prices and profits, on the one hand, and bank 
concentration, on the other. The structure-conduct view 
equates concentration with lack of competition, so all else 
equal, concentration should be associated with lower deposit 
rates, less efficiency, and higher profits. The conduct-structure 
view equates concentration with greater efficiency, so concen-
tration should be associated with higher deposit rates and 
greater efficiency in more concentrated markets.
Studies of the banking industry largely support the 
structure-conduct view. In fact, banks in more concentrated 
markets pay lower deposit rates (Berger 1995; Berger and 
Hannan 1989), charge higher loan rates (Hannan 1991), and 
are less efficient (Berger and Hannan 1998).7 In view of this 
evidence, and following most of the related literature, this 
article uses higher concentration as a proxy for lower 
competition, rather than greater efficiency.
4. Branch Price Data and Their 
Relation to State and Local 
Concentration
Our sample comprises 110 branch sales between 1992 and 1999 
in ten northeastern states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. The branch sale data 
were obtained from SNL Financial. The SNL Financial deal 
data were matched with branch-level Summary of Deposits 
data collected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
We found complete matches for 111 of the initial 220 deals 
obtained from the SNL Financial data. Our small data set 
makes some results sensitive to how we treat the data, as we 
discuss below.
The distribution of deals across years and states is reported 
in Table 2. Sixty-nine deals occurred in New York, New Jersey, 
and Pennsylvania. The number of deals picked up substantially 
after 1993—the year before passage of the Riegle-Neal 
7Significantly, Berger and Hannan (1998) allow for the possibility that 
efficiency differences could cause differences in concentration by using two-
state least squares (using population as an instrument for concentration). Their 
finding that concentration reduces efficiency helps explain why banks in more 
concentrated markets do not earn substantially higher profits, even though 
they charge higher loan rates and pay lower deposit rates; bank managers may 
sacrifice higher profits in exchange for a “quiet life.”FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2006 19
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. The average 
branch sale involved 3.3 branches, with a range of 1 to 28. 
About half (55) the deals involved just a single branch. Average 
deposits across deals were $122.5 million.
Table 3 reports summary statistics on branch prices. The 
pricing of a branch deal requires some explanation. In most 
deals, the buyer acquires the physical assets, such as premises, 
and assumes the deposit liabilities (Berkovec, Mingo, and 
Zhang 1997).8 Deposit liabilities usually exceed assets, so the 
difference represents the “price” paid by the buyer, even if no 
money changes hands. The price is usually expressed as a 
premium per deposit. For example, if a bank buys a branch 
with assets worth $75 and deposits of $100, the premium per 
deposit is 4 (25/100). The average premium per deposit in this 
sample ranged from 0 to 21.9, with an average of 6.56.
The reasons for selling a branch are varied. Some sellers may 
need to raise capital or be rid of far-off, hard-to-manage branches. 
Other sellers may unload branches to reduce their market share 
8The branch seller may include loans in the deal if there are no nearby loan-
servicing facilities, but buyers often choose not to purchase loans because of 
uncertainty about their quality (Benz 1998, p. 33). 
before merging with another bank in that market; by selling 
branches before applying to merge, banks can avoid a forced 
divestiture of branches as a condition of merger approval.
Table 3 also reports statistics on bank concentration (HHI) 
at both the state and market levels at the date of the deal. The 
state HHI is measured precisely for all deals. The market HHI 
is measured precisely for single branch deals and for multiple 
branch deals when all branches are located in the same market, 
but for multimarket deals, “the market HHI” is actually the 
weighted average of the HHI across the markets where the 
branches in the deal are located. The HHI in each market is 
weighted by the share of total deal deposits located at branches 
in each market.9 Averaging causes some error in the market 
HHI measurement, but probably not much; there were only 
twenty-three multimarket deals, and sixteen of them involved 
just two markets (six deals involved three markets and one 
deal involved four markets).
Chart 1 presents a scatterplot of the prices for each branch 
deal against the corresponding state HHI and market HHI. 
Note the outlier in the branch premium–market HHI plot; as 
we will see, the relationship between branch prices and market 
HHI depends on whether we include that observation.
9For example, if 25 percent of the deposits in a deal were at branches in a 
market with an HHI of 1,000 and 75 percent were at branches in a market 
with an HHI of 2,000, the weighted HHI for the deal would be 1,750.
Table 2
Distribution of Bank Branch Sales 












1992 4 1.00 0.00 1 1
1993 1 1.00 — 1 1
1994 15 1.93 1.75 1 7
1995 38 3.61 4.10 1 20
1996 13 3.54 5.17 1 20
1997 11 4.36 4.88 1 16
1998 15 2.67 2.77 1 10












Connecticut 8 5.25 6.32 1 20
Delaware 2 4.50 4.95 1 8
Maine 5 2.20 1.64 1 4
Maryland 10 2.40 2.27 1 7
Massachusetts 12 4.92 6.23 1 20
New Hampshire 1 3.00 0.00 3 3
New Jersey 14 3.00 2.54 1 11
New York 24 3.92 5.90 1 28
Pennsylvania 31 2.13 2.74 1 16
Vermont 4 4.25 3.30 1 8
  Total 111 3.31 4.34 1 28
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 3





Premium-deposit ratio 6.52 3.91 0 21.88
Deposits 
  (thousands of dollars) 122.54 2,589.86 2.2 1,600
Log (deposits) 3.59 1.47 .79 7.38
Branches 3.31 4.34 1 28
Log (branches) 0.73 0.87 0 3.33
Dow Jones Bank Index
  (percentage change) 0.00 0.60 -5.76 -0.44
Bank concentration
Market HHIa 355 598 18 5,137
State HHI 667 221 382 1,790
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: HHI, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, measures deposit market 
concentration. HHI = Σi (Si)2, where Si = share of market (or state) bank 
deposits at bank i. 
aMarket is defined by each Federal Reserve Bank. 20 Local or State?
Chart 1
Branch Price versus Federal Reserve Bank 
Market HHI and State HHI
Sources: SNL Financial (branch premia); authors’ calculations (HHI).
Notes: HHI, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, measures deposit 
market concentration. The lower-right panel shows the relationship 

















Average Branch Prices and HHI Each Year 
Sources: SNL Financial (branch premia); authors’ calculations (HHI).
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Chart 2 plots average branch prices and HHI—market 
and state—for deals occurring each year. All three trends are 
upward. The upward trend in concentration reflects the merger 
wave over the 1990s.
According to Benz (1998, p.33), the deposit premium 
depends on “the relative attractiveness of the market area and 
earnings potential” (emphasis added). Market attractiveness, 
in turn, should depend on concentration: all else equal, a 
branch in more concentrated markets should have higher 
earnings and thus a higher premium.
To test which measure of concentration matters most in 
explaining branch price, we regress branch prices on market 
HHI, state HHI, and a short set of control variables
price/deposit = α + γ  market HHI 
 + β state HHI + χ controls + ε.
The local-market hypothesis implies a positive coefficient 
on market HHI and a zero coefficient on state HHI: γ  > 0, 
β = 0. The state-market hypothesis implies the opposite: γ  = 0, 
β > 0.
Our control set is limited by our small sample. Branch prices 
should depend on overall banking profitability, so we include 
the average monthly return on the Dow Jones Bank Stock 
Index (DJBANKi). Larger branches may fetch higher prices 
because of economies of scale, so we include the deal deposits, 
measured in log units (log deposits).
In some regressions, we control for the state where the 
branches were located and/or the year the branches were sold. 
The state indicators account for fixed differences between 
states in the average branch premium. Controlling for the state 
amounts to subtracting the mean of each variable (over time) 
from every observation on that variable. Controlling for the 
year amounts to subtracting the mean of each variable (over 
states) from each observation of that variable. With the 
“demeaned” variables, the regressions estimate how deviations 
from average in the branch premium within a given state or 
year (or both) are related to deviations from average in each 
HHI within the same state or year (or both). 
Table 4 reports the regression results. Both HHIs were 
divided by 100 to avoid reporting many zeros. Regressions 1-4 
include market HHI, but not state HHI. The coefficient on 
market HHI is significant at the 1 percent to 5 percent level for 
every regression (1-4). Regressions 5-8 include state HHI, but 
not market HHI. In the regressions without year controls (5-6), 
the coefficient on market HHI is significant at the 1 percent 
level. The R2 for those regressions is 23 percent to 29 percent 
higher than it is for the corresponding regressions with just 
market HHI (1-2). Looking across all years, in other words, one 
sees that branch prices depend more on the state HHI than on 
the market HHI.
In the regressions with year controls (7-8), state HHI is 
insignificant. The R2 for those regressions is lower than it is for 
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the difference in R2 is very small. Within a given year, in other 
words, it does not matter much whether one looks at market 
HHI or state HHI.
The final regressions, 9-12, include both market HHI and 
state HHI. Without year controls (9-10), the state HHI coef-
ficient is significant at the 1 percent level, but the market HHI 
coefficient is insignificant. The (adjusted) R2 for regressions 
9 and 10 is barely different from that for the corresponding 
regressions (5-6) with state HHI by itself. Given state HHI, in 
other words, market HHI has very little marginal explanatory 
value for branch prices.
In the regressions with year controls (11-12), state HHI is 
insignificant. Market HHI is also insignificant in the regression 
without state controls (12), but is significant in the regression 
with year and state controls (11). State HHI is insignificant 
within a given year partly because our sample comprises only 
eight years; limited variation in state HHI across states makes 
the relationship between state HHI and branch prices hard to 
estimate precisely (hence the higher standard errors of the 
within-year estimates). Controlling for the year does not 
handicap market HHI so much because we have sixty-six 
markets in our sample. We suspect that the dominance of 
market HHI over state HHI in explaining variation in branch 
prices within a year mostly reflects the fact that our small 
sample is spread more widely across markets than across states. 
It will take more data to verify that conjecture, however. With 
a bigger data set, we would control for year, state, and market.
More data would also help with the outlier observation on 
market HHI (Chart 1) that we exclude from the regressions. 
With that outlier included, market HHI is never significant 
(in any regression), but state HHI remains significant.
Which HHI—state or market—matters most in dollar 
terms? The market HHI coefficient (when significant) 
ranges from 0.16 to 0.33, with a midpoint of 0.25. The state 
HHI coefficient (when significant) ranges from 0.62 to 1.14, 
with a midpoint of 0.88. The state HHI coefficient estimate 
Table 4
Do Branch Prices Depend on Concentration (HHI) at the Local Market Level or at the State Level?
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
Constant -8.43*** -13.15*** -11.21*** -13.48*** -10.91*** -17.57*** -11.63*** -5.87** -2.20* -8.84*** -1.99 -16.38***
(2.81) (3.32) (2.38) (2.73) (2.52) (2.93) (2.42) (2.88) (1.16) (2.09) (1.25) (25.63)
Market HHI/100 0.25*** 0.33*** 0.16* 0.26** 0.06 0.20 0.17 0.28**
(0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
State HHI/100 0.67*** 1.23*** 0.17 0.65 0.62*** 1.14*** -0.01 0.62
(0.13) (0.24) (0.14) (0.42) (0.17) (0.24) (0.19) (0.39)
Log deposits 1.35*** 1.61*** 1.33*** 1.44*** 1.23*** 1.31*** 1.29*** 1.38*** 1.24*** 1.32*** 1.33*** 1.39***
(0.27) (0.27) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23)
Bank stock index 69.90*** 37.97* 30.81 27.64 71.53*** 39.47 32.3 32.3 70.46*** 38.87 30.73 29.69
Percentage change 23.75 21.88 26.71 25.05 22.37 24.75 27.81 27.91 22.69 24.06 26.69 3.52
State controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year controls? No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Number of 
    observations 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
R2 0.35 0.45 0.60 0.65 0.43 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.43 0.60 0.60 0.66
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: HHI, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, measures deposit market concentration.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.22 Local or State?
is 3.5 times larger than the market HHI coefficient, but then 
again, market HHI varies more than state HHI (Table 1). The 
standard deviation in market HHI is only about 2.7 times larger 
than the standard deviation in state HHI, however, so in the 
end, state HHI matters more for branch prices: the branch 
premium per deposit increases by 1.95 per one-standard-
deviation increase in state HHI (222 x 0.0088). The average 
premium per deposit is 6.5, so an increase of 1.95 is large. 
By contrast, the premium per deposit increases by just 
1.5 per one-standard-deviation increase in market HHI.
5. Robustness and Caveats
5.1 Divestiture? 
Our source for branch price data, SNL Financial, does not 
identify which deals, if any, were divestitures pursuant to a 
merger.10 The forced nature of divestitures is potentially 
problematic: divestitures occur in more concentrated markets, 
so if divested branches sell for less, our estimate of the price-
market concentration relationship might be biased down-
ward. Prices on divested branches are determined through 
competitive bidding, however, so sellers should not necessarily 
have to sell at a discount. We also analyzed whether the 
particular markets covered in our sample were more 
concentrated than the average market in northeastern states 
(implying that divestitures might be more likely in our 
sample), but found that they were not.
5.2 Similar Results for Single-Branch Deals
Recall that for multibranch deals, market HHI is the weighted 
average of the HHI across the markets involved. By contrast, 
none of the deals in our sample covers multiple states, so state 
HHI is not an average. 
Does averaging the HHI across markets cause errors in 
market HHI that make state HHI look more important by 
comparison? No. Regressions with just the set of fifty-four 
single-branch deals are very similar to regressions using 
multibranch deals as well. The relative size and significance on 
market HHI and state HHI are about the same as they are in 
regressions 9-12 in Table 4; only state HHI is significant in the 
models without year effects (analogous to 9 and 10), but only 
market HHI is significant with year effects. 
10Regulators may require the merging banks to reduce their market share by 
selling off branches.
5.3 No Controls for Branch Efficiency
A potential problem arises from the fact that our regressions 
do not control for differences in branch efficiency. More 
efficient branches will certainly sell for higher prices, and 
branch efficiency might be correlated with market (or state) 
concentration as the better branches wind up dominating the 
market. Thus, the positive correlation between branch prices 
and concentration (market or state) might really reflect an 
omitted third variable—efficiency—that is positively 
correlated with both branch prices and concentration.11 
Controlling directly for branch efficiency would be the 
natural way to rule out this alternative interpretation of our 
findings, but compiling branch-level efficiency measures 
would be prohibitive. As a shortcut, we did control for the 
number of years since a state relaxed branch restrictions as a 
(statewide) proxy for branch efficiency.12 Including years since 
deregulation as an additional control variable did not alter the 
relative importance of market HHI and state HHI in explaining 
branch prices. 
6. Conclusion
Are banking markets local or statewide? We do not settle the 
question here, but we advance it with a new, arguably better, 
indicator of market size: bank branch prices. Some of our 
regression results are consistent with the hypothesis of 
statewide banking markets. Across all years in our sample—
1992-99—branch prices are more closely correlated with bank 
concentration at the state level than at the designated market 
level. State-level concentration also tends to matter more for 
branch prices in dollars and cents, not just in statistical terms.
Some caveats are in order, however. First, our data cover 
only branch sales in northeastern states. Whether our results 
apply to the rest of the country is another question. Second, the 
relationship between branch prices and state concentration for 
northeastern states is significant across years but not within 
years. The insignificant relationship within years may stem 
from our small data set of just ten states, but it might also 
mean that the relationship between branch prices and state 
11It is not obvious, however, that omitting branch efficiency leads to bias that 
favors state HHI over market HHI. Also, observe that this alternative inter-
pretation is more in line with the performance-structure view discussed earlier, 
wherein differences in firm performance lead to differences in market 
structure. Our analysis is more in line with the structure-performance 
paradigm, wherein differences in market structure dictate firm performance. 
Recall also that the balance of evidence supports the structure-performance 
paradigm, wherein differences in concentration across markets reflect 
differences in competition (not efficiency).
12See Strahan (forthcoming) for a review of his findings on the efficiency gains 
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concentration across years is spurious. We cannot say for sure 
without more data. 
Going forward, other researchers might wish to consider 
studying branch prices over all states. With branch price data 
covering the entire country, we might settle the “local or state?” 
debate once and for all. Of course, it may not be just one or the 
other; markets in the northeast may be larger than those in 
other parts of the country. Either way, it is important to 
banking consumers to get the markets right.References
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